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Sylvia Gottschalk∗
Abstract: We compare two models of corporate default by calculating the Jeffreys-
Kullback-Leibler divergence between their predicted default probabilities when asset cor-
relations are either high or low. Our main results show that the divergence between the
two models increases in highly correlated, volatile, and large markets, but that it is closer
to zero in small markets, when asset correlations are low and firms are highly leveraged.
These findings suggest that during periods of financial instability the single-and multi-
factor models of corporate default will generate increasingly inconsistent predictions.
Keywords: Structural models of default risk, single and multi-factor models, asset cor-
relation, entropy, Kullback-Leibler divergence, random correlation matrices, financial reg-
ulation.
1 Introduction
The single-factor, single-firm structural model is the cornerstone of credit risk analysis,
and has thus become the building block of international financial regulation in the Basel II
and III Capital Adequacy Accords (BIS, 2006, 2011). In this model pair-wise asset corre-
lations can be ignored provided the respective assets account for an asymptotically small
share of a credit portfolio (Gordy, 2003). Although there is evidence that a multi-factor
model would predict default risk more accurately because it would take into account asset
correlations, the computational tractability of the single-factor model offsets its oversim-
plifying assumptions (Pykhtin, 2004; Emmer and Tasche, 2005; Tasche, 2006).
However, asset correlations have increased significantly in the past two decades, and even
more so since the 2008 financial crisis (Aı¨t-Sahalia and Xiu, 2015; Sandoval Jr. and De
Paula Franca, 2012; Pollet and Wilson, 2010; Frank, 2009; Krishnan et al., 2009; Morana
and Beltratti, 2008; Duffie et al., 2009; Das et al., 2007; Rangvid, 2001; Longin and Solnik,
1995, amongst others). Higher co-movements of asset returns have negative repercussions
for portfolio diversification, in which risk reduction hinges exclusively on imperfectly cor-
related assets. Diversification issues also arise in the risk management of portfolios of
corporate debt, and of collateralised debt obligations, in which asset correlation and de-
fault correlation have been shown to be linked (Das et al., 2006; Lopez, 2004). Credit risk
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analysis in industry and financial regulation relies almost exclusively on default probabili-
ties calculated using Merton (1974)’s single factor structural model, which defines default
as the event of the asset value of a corporate firm being lower than the face value if its
debt. Merton (1974)’s model clearly ignores asset correlations, which are introduced in
extensions developed by Vasicek (1991, 2002); Tasche (2006); Zhou (2001); Cathcart and
El-Jahel (2004).
This paper builds a multi-factor model where individual corporate asset value follows a
geometric Brownian motion which is correlated with that of other firms. We derive the
multi-factor probability distribution of asset value and run Monte Carlo simulations as-
suming either high or low asset correlations1. We also run simulations of the single-factor
probability of default, i.e., the default probability of a corporate whose asset value is not
correlated with that of other firms. The correlation matrices used to simulate the multi-
factor default probability are randomly generated. Under the high correlation scenario,
the pair-wise correlation coefficients are in the range [−0.99;−0.8] ∪ [0.99, 0.8]. In a low
correlation matrix all the pair-wise correlation coefficients are in [−0.4;−0.1] ∪ [0.4; 0.1].
For each pair of probabilities of default, we calculate its Jeffreys-Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence. In the context of this paper, it quantifies the extent of the misrepresentation
of the actual probability of default when the single factor rather than the multi-factor
model is assumed to be the correct distribution generating asset values (or vice-versa)
(Golan, 2006; Zellner, 2002; Kullback and Leibler, 1951; Burbea and Rao, 1982). Entropy
measures have been extensively used in finance. The maximum entropy principle (MEP)
was used to estimate the probability distribution of the underlying asset of an option
using the market option prices as data in Buchen and Kelly (1996); Neri and Schneider
(2012), and to estimate the price of stock and bond options in Gulko (1999, 2002). Secu-
rities derivatives in incomplete markets can also be priced by minimizing cross-entropy as
shown in Branger (2004). Borland (2002); Borland and Bouchaud (2004) build an option-
pricing model derived from a non-Gaussian model of stock returns, which are assumed
to evolve according to a nonlinear Fokker-Planck equation which maximizes the Tsallis
nonextensive entropy. Finally, Maasoumi and Racine (2002) develop an entropy metric
of dependence to show -amongst other results- that stock returns are serially dependent.
Our results show that the probability of default of an uncorrelated firm diverges signifi-
cantly from that of a multi-correlated firm when asset correlations are high, but that it
diverges much less when asset correlations are low. In some cases, the divergence is close
to zero and the two models may be considered proxies for each other, namely, when asset
correlations and market size are low, and the debt-to-asset-value ratio is high (150 to 200
percent). However, when market size, debt-to-value ratios and correlations are high, the
two models produce inconsistent default probabilities. Clearly, as asset correlations rise
the single-factor model starts to misrepresent actual default probabilities. Further cases
are analysed in Section 4.
Overall, we find that the discrepancy between the two models is exacerbated when firm’s
1in our model correlations and volatility are either both high or both low.
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indebtedness is between 10 to 100 percent and in highly correlated markets. Our findings
have implications for financial regulation. The Basel II and III Capital Adequacy Accords
stipulate that capital provisions should be calculated in accordance with a single-factor,
single-firm structural model (BIS, 2006, 2011). Our paper suggests that in periods of
financial instability, when asset volatility and correlations increase, one of the models
may misreport default risk and thus lead to inadequate capital provisions. Our results
are congruent with Aı¨t-Sahalia and Xiu (2015); Pollet and Wilson (2010); Krishnan et al.
(2009). These papers find evidence that asset correlations have more predictive power
than asset volatility. Further, Das et al. (2006) found that clustering of defaults occurs
during times of high volatility because both default probabilities and correlation between
defaults increase.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents our main model and Section 3 mea-
sures of divergence. Simulations of high/low correlation matrices are described in Section
3.1. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of simulations of our model. Section 5
concludes and precedes the Appendix.
2 Multi-factor model of corporate value
Consider m dependent Brownian motions Bt = (B1,t, ..., Bm,t) defined on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P), where F(t) is the filtration associated with Bt, and P a probability
measure. The market has N firms with correlated asset values {V1,t, ..., , VN,t}, for t ∈
[0, T ]. Vi,t satisfies the differential equation
dVi,t = Vi,t (µidt+ σidBi,t) (1)
where µi is its drift and σi its volatility. The Brownian motions Bj,t are correlated,
in the sense that dBjtdBkt = ρjk, for j, k = 1, ...,m, with correlation coefficient ρjk =
1
σjσl
∑m
l=1 σjlσkl, for all j, k = 1, ...,m.
Bj,t, j = 1, ...,m can be rewritten as a function of independent Brownian motions Wj,t.
Let
σi =
[
m∑
j=1
σ2ij
]1/2
for all i=1,...,N (2)
and
dBj,t =
m∑
j=1
σij
σi
dWj,t for all i=1,...,N (3)
then, by substituting in (2) and (3) in (1), (1) becomes
dVi,t = Vi,t
(
µidt+
m∑
j=1
σijdWj,t
)
(4)
3
We show below that the volatility of Vi,t, i = 1, .., N , depends on the pair-wise covariances
between the m stochastic processes Wj,t driving the value of the other firms in the market.
Proposition 2.1. The solution of (4) is the set of values {V1,t, ..., , VN,t} such that
Vi,t = Vi,0exp
{
(µi − 1
2
m∑
j=1
σ2ij)t+
m∑
j=1
σijWj,t
}
i = 1, ..., N (5)
where exp{.} ≡ e(.) is the exponential function. Moreover, Vi,t is log-Normally distributed
with mean
E[Vi,t] = Vi,0 exp{(µi)t} (6)
and variance
V ar[Vi,t] = V
2
i,0 exp{2µit}(exp
{
m∑
j=1
σ2ijt
}
− 1) (7)
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Default is defined as the event of the value of the i-th firm, Vi,T , being lower than the face
value of its debt Di at a given time t = T . The probability of this event is
P (Vi,T ≤ Di) = P (Vi,0Xi,T ≤ Di) = P (Xi,T ≤ ln(Di/Vi,0)) i = 1, ..., N (8)
where Xi,t = exp{(µi − 12
∑m
j=1 σ
2
ij)t+
∑m
j=1 σijWj,t} for i=1,...,N.
P (Xi,T ≤ ln(Di/Vi,0)) = Nm (ln(Di/Vi,0)) i = 1, ..., N (9)
where Nm(.) is the cumulative Normal distribution of Xi,t when m > 1.
The single-factor model is retrieved from (4) and (5) for m = 1,
Vi,t = Vi,0exp
{(
µi − 1
2
(σi)
2
)
t+ σiWi
}
i = 1, ..., N (10)
and
P (Vi,T ≤ Di) = Ns(ln(Di/Vi,0)) i = 1, ..., N (11)
where Ns(.) is the cumulative Normal distribution of Xi,t when m = 1.
The model presented above is closely related to the single-and multi-factor models used
extensively in credit risk analysis (Tasche, 2006; Pykhtin, 2004; Vasicek, 2002). In these
papers, pairwise correlations between two assets are not directly modelled. It is assumed
instead that both assets are correlated to one (or more) underlying factor(s), and that
the assets are independent from each other conditional on the common factor(s). Their
set-up can be retrieved from our model by assuming that each Brownian motion Bi,t =√
ρY +
√
1− ρi, i = 1, ..,m, where Y is the (single) common factor, and i is a firm-
specific error, rather than dBjtdBkt = ρjk, for j, k = 1, ...,m as we do above.
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3 Divergence measures and simulation of correlation
matrices
We examine the discrepancy between (11) and (9) by measuring the Jeffreys-Kullback-
Leibler divergence between these two probabilities. Let f1(x) and f2(x) be two probability
distribution functions over Rm, where m is the number of dependent Brownian motions
in Section 2 above.
The Jeffreys-Kullback-Leibler divergence measure between f1(x) and f2(x) is defined as
J(f1, f2) = I1,2(f1, f2) + I2,1(f2, f1) (12)
where
I1,2(f1, f2) =
∫ ∞
0
f1(x)log
(
f1(x)
f2(x)
)
dx (13)
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence or cross-entropy2. (Kullback and Leibler, 1951). Al-
though (13) does satisfy I1,2(f1, f1) = 0 and the positivity condition I1,2(f1, f2) > 0
whenever f1 6= f2, it is not a true metric distance, because it is not symmetric and does
not satisfy the triangle inequality (Ullah, 1996). However, it can be thought of as an
“entropy distance” between f1(x) and f2(x). It quantifies the loss of information occuring
when considering f2(x) as the correct probability distribution when the true distribution
is f1(x). If we were to use the Kullback-Leibler divergence measure, we would have to
arbitrarily decide whether the multi-factor or the single-factor probability of default is the
true probability of default. Owing to the asymmetry of the Kullback-Leibler divergence, if
the multi-factor distribution fm is assumed to be the true distribution, then Im,s(fm, fs) =∫∞
0
fm(x)log
(
fm(x)
fs(x)
)
dx, which differs from Is,m(fs, fs) =
∫∞
0
fs(x)log
(
fs(x)
fm(x)
)
dx.
In this paper, we restrict ourselves to measuring the divergence between the probability of
default resulting from two different models of corporate default without making a priori
assumptions about the accuracy of any one model. Consequently, we opt for a symmetric
extension of the Kullback-Leibler measure proposed in Kullback and Leibler (1951) and
Burbea and Rao (1982), the Jeffreys-Kullback-Leibler divergence measure.
Substituting (13) into (12), (12) becomes
J(f1, f2) =
∫ ∞
0
(f1(x)− f2(x))log
(
f1(x)
f2(x)
)
dx (14)
(14) remains a pseudo-metric, since it violates the triangle inequality, but it does satisfy
all the other properties of a metric (Kullback and Leibler, 1951; Ullah, 1996).
2(13) reduces to the Shannon entropy when f2(x) is a uniform distribution, i.e.
− ∫∞
0
f1(x)log(f1(x))dx.
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3.1 Simulating correlation matrices
The most straightforward way to simulate a random correlation matrix consists of generat-
ing random data from a given distribution and then calculate their pair-wise correlations.
However, the resulting matrix may not necessarily have the desired consistently high (or
low) pairwise correlations. The simulated correlation structure should also be realistic.
A deterministic matrix in which all off-diagonal entries are equal to 0.9 would fulfill the
requirement of having a high correlation structure. It would nonetheless be a very poor
proxy for the asset correlations found in most financial markets. In order to systematically
generate realistic positive definite matrices with given correlations, we adapt an algorithm
created by Hardin et al. (2013). In their paper, a “noise” is added to a correlation matrix
in such a way that the resulting matrix will have blocks of pair-wise correlations whose
values are within a predetermined range.
More precisely, let S = (Sij)
m
i,j=1 be a m×m matrix generated by calculating the pairwise
correlations of random data. From a Uniform probability distribution we draw a “noise”
δij ∈ [−1, 1] which is added to Sij, i 6= j, subject to the restriction that the resulting
entry Sˆij = Sij + δij, i 6= j, should be between [ρmin, ρmax]. In our “high asset correla-
tion” scenario, all the entries Sˆij are within [−0.99,−0.8] or within [0.8, 0.99]. In the “low
asset correlation” alternative, all the entries Sˆij are within [−0.4,−0.1] or within [0.1, 0.4].
Our main modification to Hardin et al. (2013)’s algorithm is that we allow δij, ρmin and
ρmax to be negative, since financial asset correlations can be either positive or negative.
In their paper correlations are always positive.
4 Results and discussion
We ran 2000 Monte Carlo simulations of the multi-factor and single factor probabilities
of default3, for a given number of firms N =10,50,90,100,500, and 10004, and a given level
of debt leverage ln(Di/Vi)=0.1,.., 2, in steps of 0.1. For each simulation, we randomly
estimate a high correlation N ×N matrix. This procedure is repeated for low correlation
matrices. The results of each set of simulations are 2000 values for the Jeffreys-Kullback-
Leibler divergence (14), from which we calculate the averages shown in Figure 1 and Table
4. Our main results are summarised as follows.
The divergence between the multi-factor and the single-factor probability of default in-
creases with asset correlation.
For N=10 to 100 firms, the graph of the low correlation divergence is significantly below
that of the high correlation divergence. For N = 10 firms, leverage equal to 10%, and
low correlation, the average divergence is J¯L=0.3400. For the same number of firms and
3All our simulations were run in R (R Core Team, 2016). The algorithm that generates random
correlation matrices was adapted from Hardin et al. (2013) and Joe (2006).
4For the sake of simplicity, we set N = m in the simulations.
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leverage, but high correlation, J¯H=0.5669. The divergences for a leverage of 200% -all
else equal- are J¯L= 0.0575 and J¯H=0.1377. Table 1 shows analogous results for other
levels of leverage and market sizes. This suggests that in periods of high correlation,
e.g., financial crises, the multi-factor default probability will differ significantly from that
of the single-factor model. One of the two models may underestimate the true default
probability. For larger market sizes, N=500 and 1000, the discrepancy between the high
and low correlation divergences is reduced. This issue is addressed in detail below.
The divergence between the multi-factor and the single-factor probability of default is in-
versely related to leverage.
This result indicates that the more indebted the firm, the less discrepancy between the
information given by the two models. For N=50 and low correlation, J¯L=0.5834 if
ln(Di/Vi)=10%, whilst J¯
L=0.1018 for ln(Di/Vi)=200%, all else equal. Clearly, in the
case of highly indebted firms, default probability tends to be similar under either model,.
Figure 1 suggests that irrespective of asset correlations, the divergence between the two
probabilities tends to zero when debt leverage increases. The implication is that for lower
levels of leverage, the two probabilities of default will diverge considerably, and will be
influenced by asset correlations. For instance, it can be seen in Table 4 that for a leverage
equal to 50%, high correlation and N=50, the average divergence is J¯H=0.3498, against
J¯L=0.2636. At that level of leverage, the multi-factor and single factor probabilities of
default will give contradictory signals.
Irrespective of asset correlations, the difference between J¯H and J¯L diminishes with the
number of firms.
For larger market sizes, N=500 and 1000 firms, the difference between the high/low cor-
relation divergences diminishes, and even seems to disappear in Figure 1. Table 1 shows
that for ln(Di/Vi)=150%, and N=1000 firms, J¯
L= 0.1772 whilst J¯H= 0.1833. However,
this difference is statistically significant at a 1% confidence level, as evidenced by the
Welch test of equality of means shown in Table 2. The Welch test is also significant at 1%
confidence level for all other market sizes and leverage values. It should be emphasized
that we are not suggesting that the multi-factor and single-factor default probabilities
will converge or even equalize when the number of firms increases. As long as J¯ 6= 0, the
two probabilities of default will diverge. Tables 1 and 2 support this finding even in large
markets.
The divergence between the two models increases with market size.
This can be seen in Figure 1 by comparing the value of average divergence when N = 10
and N = 1000. For N = 10, high correlation and leverage equal to 10%, J¯H= 0.5669,
against J¯H= 0.8201 for N = 1000, all else equal. When correlations are low and leverage
equal to 10%, J¯L= 0.3400 for N = 10 and J¯L= 0.7929 for N = 1000. The level of firm
indebtedness does not alter this result. For N = 10 and leverage at 200%, both high
and low correlation divergences become closer to zero, J¯L=0.0575 and J¯H=0.0992. For
7
Figure 1: Divergence by market size (N=10 to 1000 firms)
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Table 1: Average values of Jeffreys-Kullback-Leibler divergence
Leverage ↓ Low correlation (J¯L) High correlation (J¯H)
N=10 50 100 1000 10 50 100 1000
0.1
0.3400 0.5834 0.6683 0.7926 0.5669 0.7722 0.7952 0.8201
(0.1268) (0.0813) (0.0658) (0.0241) (0.1982) (0.1081) (0.0763) (0.0248)
0.5
0.1504 0.2636 0.3046 0.3610 0.2618 0.3498 0.3607 0.3751
(0.0567) (0.0382) (0.0308) (0.0115) (0.0931) (0.0488) (0.0358) (0.0118)
1
0.0980 0.1684 0.1954 0.2328 0.1651 0.2243 0.2330 0.2425
(0.0364) (0.0246) (0.0201) (0.0074) (0.0608) (0.0318) (0.0229) (0.0073)
1.5
0.0710 0.1266 0.1475 0.1772 0.1240 0.1700 0.1764 0.1833
(0.0275) (0.0186) (0.0140) (0.0056) (0.0448) (0.0239) (0.0172) (0.0056)
2
0.0575 0.1018 0.1185 0.1425 0.0992 0.1377 0.1415 0.1547
(0.0215) (0.0147) (0.0119) (0.0040) (0.0365) (0.0192) (0.0134) (0.0052)
2000 simulations of correlation matrices and probability of default. Standard errors in brackets.
Table 2: Welch test of equality of J¯L and J¯H in Table 1
Leverage ↓ N=10 50 100 1000
t p-value t p-value t p-value t p-value
0.1 -65.414 2.20E-16 -62.447 2.20E-16 -56.398 2.20E-16 -11.241 2.20E-16
0.5 -45.704 2.20E-16 -62.228 2.20E-16 -53.087 2.20E-16 -14.13 0.00
1 -42.279 2.20E-16 -62.182 2.20E-16 -56.788 1.31E-11 -13.27 2.20E-16
1.5 -45.062 2.20E-16 -65.491 2.20E-16 -56.619 2.20E-16 -10.863 2.20E-16
2 -44.008 2.20E-16 -66.428 2.20E-16 -56.152 2.20E-16 -26.415 2.20E-16
H0 : J¯
L − J¯H = 0 and H1 : J¯L − J¯H 6= 0. Equal sample sizes.
N = 1000, and leverage at 200%, high and low correlation divergences become closer to
each other in value, J¯L=0.1425 and J¯L=0.1547, but they are still markedly higher than
the respective divergences for N = 10.
5 Conclusion
This paper builds a multi-factor model where individual corporate asset value follows a
geometric Brownian motion which is correlated with that of other firms. We run sim-
ulations of the multi-factor default probability using randomly generated low and high
correlation matrices. We also run simulations of the single factor default probability, i.e.,
the default probability of a corporate with uncorrelated asset value. For each pair of de-
fault probabilities we calculate its Jeffreys-Kullback-Leibler divergence. Overall, we find
that the discrepancy between the two models is exacerbated in highly correlated markets
and when firm’s indebtedness is between 10 to 100 percent. Our findings have implica-
tions for financial regulation. The Basel II and III Capital Adequacy Accords stipulate
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that capital provisions should be calculated in accordance with a single-factor, single-firm
structural model (BIS, 2006, 2011). Our paper suggests that in periods of financial insta-
bility, when asset volatility and correlations increase, one of the models may misreport
default risk and thus lead to inadequate capital provisions.
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A Appendix
Our proof hinges on the Brownian motion Wi,t being Normally distributed with mean 0
and variance 1, and independent from Wj,t. It also relies on the 1/2-self-similarity property
of Brownian motions, i.e., t1/2Wj,t
d
=Wj,t. Before we proceed to the proof of Proposition
2.1, a couple of definitions and a theorem will be presented. A good introduction on
self-similar stochastic processes is Embrechts and Maejima (2002).
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A.1 Self-similarity of Brownian motions
A stochastic process {Wt, t ≥ 0} is said to have independent increments, if for any m ≥ 1
and for any partition 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < .. < tm, Wt1 −Wt0 , ..,Wtm −Wtm−1 are independent.
A formal definition of a Brownian motion will be useful in the proof of Theorem A.2.
Definition A.1. If a stochastic process {Wt, t ≥ 0} satisfies
(i) W0 = 0 a.s.,
(ii) it has independent and stationary increments,
(iii) for each t > 0, Wt has a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and variance t, and
(iv) its sample paths are continuous a.s.,
then it is called (standard) Brownian motion.
Definition A.2. A stochastic process {Wt, t ≥ 0} is said to be self-similar if for any
a > 0, there exists b > 0 such that
Wat
d
= bWt (15)
where “
d
=” means equality in distribution.
The following theorem was proved by Lamperti (1962) and shows that a self-similar
stochastic process Wat is equal in distribution to the stochastic process a
HWt. In many
texts on the topic, a self-similar process is defined by this property.
Theorem A.1. (Lamperti (1962)) If {Wt, t ≥ 0} is nontrivial, stochastically continuous
at t=0 and self-similar, then there exists a unique exponent H ≥ 0 such that b in (15)
can be expressed as b = aH. Moreover, H > 0 if and only if W0 = 0 a.s.
The following theorem will be used in our proof of Proposition 2.1.
Theorem A.2. A Brownian motion {Wt, t ≥ 0} is 1/2-self-similar.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that for every a > 0, Wat is also Brownian motion as defined
in A.1 above.
Conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) are trivially fulfilled. Regarding (iii), Gaussianity and mean-
zero property also follow from the properties of Wt. To obtain the variance, consider the
stochastic process a−1/2Wat, t ≥ 0. Its variance is
E[(a−1/2Wat)2] = a−1E[W 2at] = a
−1V ar[W (at)] = a−1(at) = t (16)
Thus Wat is a Brownian motion.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
The proof that (5) is the solution of (4) can be found in Etheridge (2001) or Shreve (2004),
amongst others. The distributional properties of Vi,t are not proved in the literature, due
to it being the building block of option-pricing models, rather than a stand-alone model
as in this paper.
Proof. Let Xt = exp{(µi − 12
∑N
j=1 σ
2
i,j)t+
∑N
j=1 σi,jWt,j}. Then Vi,t = Vi,0Xi,t, where Vi,0
is a constant. The mean of Xt is
E[Xt] = exp
{
(µi − 1
2
N∑
j=1
σ2i,j)t
}
E
[
exp
{
N∑
j=1
σi,jWj,t
}]
(17)
since the terms in the first exponential are non-random. Given that the m Brownian
motionsW1,t, ...,Wm,t are independent, the term in the expectation function can be written
as
E
[
exp
{
m∑
j=1
σi,jWj,t
}]
=
m∏
j=1
E [exp {σi,jWj,t}] (18)
From the 1/2-self-similarity property,
m∏
j=1
E [exp {σi,jWj,t}] =
m∏
j=1
E
[
exp
{
σi,jt
1/2Wt,j
}]
(19)
Since Wj,t is N(0,1), E[e
aWj,t ] = ea
2/2, where a is a real constant. This implies that
m∏
j=1
E
[
exp
{
σi,jt
1/2Wj,t
}]
=
m∏
j=1
exp
{
1
2
σ2i,jt
}
(20)
Substituting in (20) in (17) yields
E[Xt] = exp{µit} (21)
The variance of Xt, V ar(Xt) = E[X
2
t − (E(Xt)2)], can be simplified to
V ar[Xt] = exp
{
2µit−
m∑
j=1
σ2i,jt
}
E
[
exp
{
2
m∑
j=1
σi,jWj,t
}]
− exp{2µit} (22)
From the 1/2-self-similarity of Brownian motion
E
[
exp
{
2
m∑
j=1
σi,jWj,t
}]
=
m∏
j=1
E
[
exp
{
2σi,jt
1/2Wj,t
}]
=
m∏
j=1
exp
{
2σ2i,jt
}
(23)
Substituting in above
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V ar[Xt] = exp
{
2µit−
N∑
j=1
σ2i,jt+ 2
N∑
j=1
σ2i,jt
}
− exp{2µit} (24)
From which,
V ar[Xt] = exp{2µit}
(
exp
{
m∑
j=1
σ2i,jt
}
− 1
)
(25)
Vi,t = Vi,0Xt. Since Vi,0 is a constant, the mean and variance of Vi,t follow trivially.
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